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ARGUMENT 
The reply brief of Appellant / Cross- Appellee, i4, did not use headings to 
denote exactly which of Robertson's Cross-appeal arguments it was responding to. 
Robertson's believes, however, it was in the order set forth below: 
I. The Existence of The Express Contract Precludes Recovery For 
Unjust Enrichment. 
On cross-appeal, Robertson's first argument was that unjust enrichment 
could not apply because an express contract addressed the subject matter of the 
claim. In reply, i4 apparently does not dispute this well-established principle. See 
i4 Reply Brief p.p. 11-13. Instead, i4 argues simply that' 
broad discretion to the trial court in its application of unjust enrichment law to the 
facts.'" Id. p. 11, quoting Desert Miriah Inc. v.B&I Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83 \ 9 
While that is a correct general statement, such "broad discretion" does not 
allow a trial court to "ignore existing principles of law in 
equities." Warner v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 666, 670 (Utah C 
Miriah, which i4 relies on, the Utah Supreme Court noteq that "the doctrine of 
unjust enrichment was specifically developed to address situations 'that did not fit 
within a particular legal standard but which nonetheless njerited judicial 
intervention.'" Desert Miriah, 2000 UT 83, |12, quotinglState v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 1244 - 45 (Utah 1994). Contract is just such a particular legal standard and 
the existence of a contract is a bar to recovery for unjust ejnrichment. That was 
1 
[this] Court must 'afford 
favor of its view of the 
t. App. 1992). In Desert 
and still is the law in Utah. See TruGreen Cos., L.L.C. v. Mower Brothers, 2008 
UT 81, f 18 (a recent case, noting that restitution and unjust enrichment sound in 
quantum meruit and "are used only when no express contract is present"). 
II. The Factual Findings Do Not Support The Legal Conclusion That 
Robertson's Was Unjustly Enriched. 
Robertson's third argument on cross-appeal was that the factual findings did 
not support the legal conclusion that Robertson's was unjustly enriched. In its 
reply, i4 takes Robertson's argument as "attacking the factual findings of the trial 
court." i4 Reply Brief p.p. 11-12. Accordingly, i4 claims the proper standard of 
review should be clear error rather than correctness. But "[qjuestions about the 
legal adequacy of findings of fact and the legal accuracy of the trial court's 
statements present issues of law, which [Utah appellate courts] review for 
correctness, according no deference to the trial court.'" Mardanlou v. Ghaffarian, 
2006 UT App 165, P 8, 135 P.3d 904 (quoting Shar's Cars, LLC v. Elder, 2004 
UT App 258, P 12, 97 P.3d 724), cert, denied, 150 P.3d 58 (Utah 2006). 
Apparently i4 simply misses the forest for the trees. i4 is correct that 
Robertson's pointed out areas where the trial court might have difficulty making 
certain factual findings. But the main point was that those certain factual findings 
just were not made. For example, Robertson's argued there was no specific 
finding that Robertson's received a benefit. It then pointed out that such a finding 
would be hard to make because among other things, the website had not been 
2 
completed and there was no evidence or finding that i4 h^d given Robertson's the 
password to actually use the website. 
The point, however, was not that the trial court could not make a finding 
that Robertson's had been given the password or a finished website, but that it the 
trial court did not make such findings. Thus, the issue was not the difficulty, but 
the omission of a factual finding needed to support a claim for unjust enrichment. 
Absent Robertson's actually having received a working website and password to 
work it, it is questionable at best whether the unjust enrichment is a proper legal 
conclusion that can follow. Certainly however, some kind of finding of that 
nature is required, but it was not made. 
In its reply brief, i4 cites Parduhn v Bennett, for the proposition that it is 
enough if the findings are "sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary 
facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion was reached." i4 
Reply Brief p. 11 citing Parduhn, 2005 UT 22, f24. Then i4 argues that "the 
findings here are sufficiently detailed." Yet nowhere does i4 direct this Court to 
such a detailed finding. As Robertson's pointed out initially, there was no specific 
finding that Robertson's had accepted or retained the benefit of the website. 
Indeed, even at the time of trial, which was much later, the website was not 
complete, hence the trial court's directive that i4 should tender remaining rights 
3 
and access to the website to Robertson's.l This is inconsistent with a finding that 
Robertson's had already been conferred a benefit. In short, there simply was no 
finding that Robertson's had accepted or retained a benefit and i4 still does not 
direct the Court to such a finding. 
Similarly, there was no finding that Robertson's appreciated or had 
knowledge of the benefit because, although Robertson's knew there was a website 
being created, Robertson's did not know it was finished - for the simple reason 
that it wasn't, if nothing else. Similarly, Robertson's could not independently 
access the website absent a password and there was no finding that Robertson's 
had that password. In short, the findings of fact are simply insufficient to 
conclude that Robertson's was unjustly enriched. 
III. Robertson's Should Be Awarded Attorney Fees Because i4fs 
Appeal Is Based on the Contract, Which Provides for Fees. 
As if zen-like repetition will make it true, i4 continues to reiterate its claim 
that it prevailed on its contract claim at trial. Thus, at page 12 of its Reply Brief, 
i4 argues "this Court should recognize the legal consequence of the trial court's 
factual determinations, which legal consequence is that i4 Solutions won its 
breach of contract claim and is entitled to attorney fees." i4 Reply Brief p. 12. 
But i4's insistence only drives Robertson's point home with more force - the 
lSee trial court's minute entry decision, which ordered i4 to take any further steps 
necessary to tender all rights and access to the website to Robertson's. R. 235, 277 
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attorney fee provision of the contract is all that i4fs appeal can be based on. See 
generally: id, p. 5 (claiming i4 prevailed under any theory); id, p. 7 (i4 would be 
prevailing party under the contract even if it had recovered nothing); id, p.7 (i4 is 
"still the prevailing party under the contract"); id. p.9 (i4 "was the prevailing 
party and Robertson was found to have breached the contract by the plain 
language of the trial court's findings of fact"). 
Necessarily, i4 must make such claims because it is well-established that to 
recover attorney fees based on the contractual provision, the recovery must be 
based on that contract. Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149, 1150 (Utah 
1986). But because the attorney fee provision of the contract is all that i4Ts appeal 
can be based on, and i4's reiteration of its success on its contract claim is simply 
wrong, Robertson's should be awarded its attorney fees on this appeal. 
That is because on i4fs appeal we are really before the Utah Court of 
Appeals on only one issue - the propriety of an award of Attorney fees under that 
contract.2 Essentially, i4 argues alternatively that the trial court did rule that i4 
prevailed in contract or that the trial court should have ruled that i4 prevailed in 
contract. In either event, if i4 were to be successful on its appeal, it would be 
granted attorney fees for the appeal (and the trial below). By the same token, 
2As noted in its initial brief, appeal wasn't warranted because the amount at 
issue was small and no overarching legal issue was involved. Once i4 noticed its 
appeal, however, Robertson's was involved in the appellate process anyway. 
however, if it is not successful in its quest for such fees here, Robertson's should 
be awarded its fees for this appeal. As the Utah Supreme Court has noted on that 
very issue: 
If plaintiff is required to defend its position on appeal at its own 
expense plaintiffs rights under the contract are thereby diminished. 
We therefore adopt the rule of law that a provision for payment of 
attorney's fees in a contract includes attorney's fees incurred by the 
prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial, if the action is brought to 
enforce the contract... 
MgmtServs. Corp. v. Development Assocs., 617 P.2d406, 409 (Utah 1980). 
i4fs appeal is nothing more than an action brought, on appeal to enforce the 
contract as to its attorney fee provision. But i4 fails on appeal because its position 
necessarily requires findings that Robertson's breached or that i4 prevailed on its 
contract claim. If i4fs position is that those findings exist, it does not direct this 
Court to them, because the court below did not make them. Moreover, the record 
shows that the trial court specifically denied i4fs post-trial requests for a finding 
that i4 prevailed on its contract claim. The inescapable conclusion is that the trial 
court did not find i4 to have prevailed in contract. 
However, the trial court did rule in favor of i4 based on unjust enrichment 
and so it directed i4 to prepare the findings of fact and conclusions of law. If i4 
felt that the trial court should have found that Robertson's breached, it was i4fs 
duty on appeal to marshal the evidence against its position and show that, despite 
that evidence, the trial court should have found Robertson's breached. i4 has not 
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done so and so its appeal fails on that point also. 
Nor can i4 complain about insufficient findings. i4 
those necessary findings in the findings it submitted to the! 
itself failed to include 
trial court. It would be 
an error invited by i4's own act and barred under the invited error doctrine. "The 
invited error doctrine prohibits parties from 'taking advantage of an error 
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error/" 
Newman v. Write Water Whirlpool, 2008 UT 79, f 14 (Utah 2008) quoting 
Tschaggeny v. Milbanklns. Co., 2007 UT 37, f^ 12. If 14 tijily felt that the trial 
i 
court meant to rule that i4 prevailed on a contract theory (despite the trial court's 
explicit ruling to the contrary), it was incumbent on i4 to prepare findings of fact 
that would support that theory. This would have included a finding that 
Robertson's breached the contract and perhaps an ultimate finding that i4 
prevailed in contract. i4, however, did not do that either. Having failed to prepare 
the findings i4 now complains of - the very error it created - |i4's appeal must fail 
under the doctrine of invited error. 
CONCLUSION 
The only issue raised by i4 is attorney fees due under the contract. 
However, i4fs appeal fails because the trial court did not find that i4 prevailed in 
contract and, indeed, explicitly refused to make such a fmdin In such a case, 
proper interpretation of statute, case law and sound policy dictate that Robertson's 
7 
and similar parties should be awarded attorney fees as a prevailing party on 
appeal. 
/•*» 
DATED this (8 day of September, 2009. 
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Attorney forPiamtiff/Appellee 
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